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Abstract: A wireless medical sensor network (WMSN) can sense humans’ physiological 
signs without sacrificing patient comfort and transmit patient vital signs to health 
professionals’ hand-held devices. The patient physiological data are highly sensitive and 
WMSNs are extremely vulnerable to many attacks. Therefore, it must be ensured that 
patients’ medical signs are not exposed to unauthorized users. Consequently, strong user 
authentication is the main concern for the success and large scale deployment of WMSNs. 
In this regard, this paper presents an efficient, strong authentication protocol, named   
E-SAP, for healthcare application using WMSNs. The proposed E-SAP includes: (1) a 
two-factor (i.e., password and smartcard) professional authentication; (2) mutual 
authentication between the professional and the medical sensor; (3) symmetric 
encryption/decryption for providing message confidentiality; (4) establishment of a secure 
session key at the end of authentication; and (5) professionals can change their password. 
Further, the proposed protocol requires three message exchanges between the professional, 
medical sensor node and gateway node, and achieves efficiency (i.e., low computation and 
communication cost). Through the formal analysis, security analysis and performance 
analysis, we demonstrate that E-SAP is more secure against many practical attacks, and 
allows a tradeoff between the security and the performance cost for healthcare application 
using WMSNs.  
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1. Introduction  
During the last few years, we have seen the great emergence of wireless medical sensor networks 
(WMSNs) in the healthcare industry. Wireless medical sensors are the cutting edge components for 
healthcare application and provide drastically improved quality-of-care without sacrificing patient 
comfort.  
A wireless medical sensor network is a network that consists of lightweight devices with limited 
memory, low computation processing, low-battery power and low bandwidth [1]. These medical 
sensors (e.g., ECG electrodes, pulse oxi-meter, blood pressure, and temperature sensors) are deployed 
on patient’s body and collect the individual’s physiological data and sends the collected data via a 
wireless channel to health professionals’ hand-held devices (i.e., PDA, iPhone, laptop, etc.). A 
physician can use these medical sensor readings to gain a broader assessment of patient’s health status. 
The patient’s physiological data may include heartbeat rates, temperature, blood pressure, blood 
oxygen level, etc. A typical patient monitoring in hospital environment is shown in Figure 1. 
Figure 1. Patient monitoring using a wireless medical sensor network in a hospital environment. 
 
Several research groups and projects are working in health monitoring using wireless sensor 
networks, for example, CodeBlue [2], LiveNet [3], MobiHealth [4], UbiMon [5], Alarm-Net [6], 
ReMoteCare [7], SPINE [8], etc. Thus, healthcare systems are the applications that most benefit from 
using wireless medical sensor technology that can perform patient care within hospitals, clinics and 
homecare.  Sensors 2012, 12  
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Wireless medical sensor technology has offered tremendous advantages to healthcare applications, 
such as continuous patient monitoring, mass-causality disaster monitoring, large-scale in-field medical 
monitoring, emergency response, etc. Further, these WMSNs provide many new ways for acute 
disease analysis (e.g., motion analysis for Parkinson’s disease) [9,10].  
However, wireless healthcare development has many challenges, such as reliable data transmission, 
fast event detection, timely delivery of data, power management, node computation and middleware 
[8,11–17]. Further, patients’ security and privacy is one of the big concerns for healthcare applications, 
especially when it comes to adopting a wireless healthcare system (i.e., wireless medical sensors, 
wireless gateways, mobile devices, etc. [18]). Although wireless healthcare offers many advantages to 
patient monitoring, the physiological data of an individual are highly vulnerable. Further, due to the 
wireless nature of devices (i.e., medical sensors, iPhone, PDA, etc.), the patients’ vital signs are much 
easier to query and monitor (i.e., in an ad hoc manner) within the hospital ward rooms using smart 
phones, iPhones, PDAs, and laptops, so any adversary can be eavesdropping on patients locally in the 
ward room using their hand-devices that could cause of patient privacy breaches. More importantly, 
the patient vitals are very sensitive; so they (i.e., the patient’s vitals) must be kept secure from 
unauthorized users and security threats [19–28]. Moreover, government laws (e.g., the Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA)) also regulated stringent rules for 
healthcare providers, such as; individuals’ vital signs are only revealed to authorized professionals 
(i.e., doctors, caregivers and nurses) and family members [29,30]. A healthcare provider is subject to 
strict civil and criminal penalties (i.e., either fine or imprisonment) if HIPAA rules are not followed 
properly [29,30]. Furthermore, as wireless medical sensor nodes themselves provide services to users 
(doctors, nurses, and technicians, are a few examples) it is necessary to control who is accessing their 
(the medical sensors’) information and whether they are authenticated to do so. Therefore, strong user 
authentication is a core requirement to protect from illegal access to patients’ vital signs, and can attain 
the highest levels of patients’ privacy. 
So far many significant researches have been proposed for healthcare using sensor networks and 
provide sufficient security, such as data confidentiality, authentication, integrity and preserving patient 
privacy [31–39]. These schemes do not considere strong user authentication, and hence, lack a security 
mechanism, according to the HIPAA laws [29,30]. Further, in [40–46] the authors proposed a few user 
authentication protocol for wireless sensor networks, which are either broken or provide less security 
at very high computation and communication costs. Consequently, to the best of our knowledge, a 
strong user authentication (i.e., professional authentication) protocol for wireless healthcare applications 
has not yet been addressed effectively in order to prevent illegal access to wireless medical sensor data.  
In this paper, we discuss: (1) the healthcare architecture and major security requirements for 
healthcare application using wireless medical sensor networks; and (2) propose an efficient-strong 
authentication protocol, named E-SAP, for healthcare applications using WMSNs. The proposed 
scheme uses two-factor (i.e., password and smartcard) user authentication, where each user must prove 
their authenticity first and then access the patient vital signs. (Note: We used user and professional, 
interchangeably and user or professional may be a doctor, a nurse, a surgeon or a technician. 
Furthermore, it is now widely believed that two-factor authentication provides strong and high level of 
security (i.e., secure access of individual physiological data from wireless sensors) [29,30,47]).  Sensors 2012, 12  
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In addition, E-SAP provides secure session key establishment between the users and the medical 
sensor nodes, and allow users to change their password. Furthermore, we demonstrate the formal 
verification of the proposed protocol by the Burrows, Abadi and Needham (BAN) logic model [48], 
where two main security properties are verified: authenticity and secure session key establishment. 
Moreover, the proposed scheme resists many practical attacks (e.g., replay, user and gateway 
masquerade, smartcard stolen-verifier, gateway secret key guessing, password guessing, and 
information-leakage). To attain the low computational overheads, our scheme uses one-way hash 
functions along with XOR operations and symmetric cryptosystem.  
The rest of paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the healthcare architecture using 
wireless medical sensors, adversary attack model, and wireless healthcare security requirements. 
Section 3 briefly reviews the related literature for secure healthcare monitoring using medical sensor 
networks. Section 4 introduces and describes a novel E-SAP: efficient-strong authentication protocol 
for healthcare application using WMSNs. Section 5 describes the brief introduction of BAN logic and 
provides formal verification of E-SAP using the BAN logic model. Section 6 discusses the security 
analysis and efficiency evaluation in contrast to exiting schemes and finally, in Section 7 conclusions 
and future directions are presented. 
2. Healthcare Architecture, Adversary Attack Model, and Security Requirements for Healthcare 
Application in WMSN 
This section presents healthcare monitoring architecture for hospital environments, adversary attack 
models and security requirements for healthcare application using WMSNs. 
2.1. Healthcare Architecture 
A patient healthcare monitoring architecture is depicted in Figure 2, where usual patient monitoring 
is needed after patient hospitalization (e.g., after cardiac infarction). When a patient is hospitalized, 
he/she can get some suitable medical sensor devices, deployed strategically on the patient’s body. 
These sensors sense the health parameters, (e.g., blood pressure, movement, breathing, ECG etc.) and 
send physiological parameters to the professionals’ mobile devices (such as PDA, smart phone and 
laptop).  
Later, a professional may store patient data on the backend server for further processing, which is 
currently outside the scope of this paper. It is obvious that a professional can access the patient’s 
health parameters directly from the medical sensor, in an ad-hoc manner. 
As shown in the Figure 2, the healthcare architecture has three active entities, namely, user, medical 
sensors and base-station/gateway. We assume a real-time scenario, and suppose a professional wants 
to query the patient’s medical sensors for physiological information, as follows: (a) the user (Ui) sends 
a query to the gateway node (GW); (b) upon receiving the professional’s request, the gateway node 
forwards the user’s query to the medical sensor; and (c) thereafter, the medical sensor responds to the 
user. Here, the gateway node plays an important role between the professional and the medical sensor. 
Based on the above scenario, the next sub-section describes an adversary attack model for healthcare 
application using WMSNs. Sensors 2012, 12  
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Figure 2. Healthcare architecture for patient monitoring. 
 
2.2. Adversary Attack Model  
The patient’s physiological information is very sensitive and may attract many attackers, such as 
insurance companies, corrupt media persons, individual enemies, etc. Furthermore, the patient’s 
medical sensors and the professionals’ hand-held devices are wireless in nature. So, these wireless 
devices may attract unauthorized users or thieves, more especially. For example, they (unauthorized 
users or thieves) can roam to the hospital ward and easily eavesdrop on the patients locally, so we have 
categorized the attack models as follows: 
2.2.1. Eavesdropping on Wireless Medical Data 
As the medical sensors sense the patient’s body data, they transmit it over the radio communication 
channel. The wireless transmission ranges are not confined to hospital wards and these wireless 
channels are highly susceptible. As a result, an attacker may eavesdrop air messages (i.e., a patient’s 
physiological information), and can disclose the patient’s physiological information. Hence, the patient 
privacy is breached. 
2.2.2. Active Attack 
In an active attack scenario, the capability of an attacker depends on his/her skill (i.e., ability to 
monitor all the communication). An attacker may inject bogus messages into the wireless channel and 
may alter the wireless medical sensor data during the communication. Any spurious messages 
injection into the healthcare network could cause mistreatment. Furthermore, an attacker may replay 
the old messages again and again, which could cause overtreatment (i.e., medicine overdose). Thus, 
active attacks endanger and may pose a life-threatening risk to the patients.  Sensors 2012, 12  
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2.3. Security Requirements for Healthcare Application Using Wireless Medical Sensor Networks  
Based on the above attack model and literature survey [19–28] and [31–39], this sub-section 
sketches out the paramount security requirements for healthcare application in WMSNs, as follows: 
2.3.1. Strong User Authentication  
The major problem in wireless healthcare environments is the vulnerability of wireless messages to 
access by unauthorized users, so it is desirable that strong user authentication be considered, where 
each user must prove their authenticity before accessing the patient’s physiological information. 
Furthermore, strong user authentication, also known as two-factor authentication, provides greater 
security for healthcare application using wireless medical sensor networks [47]. 
2.3.2. Mutual Authentication  
In real-time healthcare applications, the user and the medical sensor must authenticate each other; 
hence, they can ensure the communication is established between the authenticated user and the 
medical sensors. 
2.3.3. Confidentiality 
The patient health data are highly sensitive and medical sensors are wireless in nature, therefore 
patient physiological data should remain confidential from passive attacks such as eavesdropping or 
traffic analysis. Thus, patient’s health data is only accessed or used by authorized professionals. 
2.3.4. Session Key Establishment 
A session key should be established between a user/professional and a medical sensor node, so that 
subsequent communication could take place securely. 
2.3.5. Low Communication and Computational Cost 
Since wireless medical sensors are resource constrained devices, and the healthcare application’s 
functions also need room for executing their tasks, the protocol must be efficient in terms of 
communication and computational cost. 
2.3.6. Data Freshness  
Generally, professionals need patient physiological data at regular intervals, so there must be 
guarantee that patient health data is recent or fresh. Furthermore, it (data freshness) also ensures that 
an adversary cannot replay the old messages.  
2.3.7. Secure Against Popular Attacks  
In real-time healthcare environments the protocol should be defensive against different popular 
attacks, such as replay attack, impersonation attack, stolen-verifier attack, password guessing attack, Sensors 2012, 12  
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and information-leakage attack. As a result, the protocol can be easily applicable to the real-time 
wireless healthcare applications. 
2.3.8. User-Friendliness  
The healthcare architecture should be easy to deploy as well as user-friendly; such as, a user can 
update his/her password securely, whenever he/she needs to. 
3. Related Work 
This section discusses the literature reviewed for secure healthcare monitoring using wireless 
sensor networks and general user authentication protocols for wireless sensor networks that have been 
recently proposed. 
Malasri et al. [31] designed and implemented a secure wireless mote-base medical sensor network 
for healthcare applications. The main components of their scheme are: (i) two-tier architecture is 
designed for the patient data authentication; (ii) a secure key exchange protocol (i.e., elliptic curve 
cryptography (ECC)) is used to establish secret shared keys between the sensor nodes and the base 
station; and (iii) a symmetric encryption/decryption algorithm provides confidentiality and integrity to 
patient data. Moreover, in their architecture each sensor mote has incorporated a fingerprint scanner; 
by doing so, the patient’s identity is verified with the aid of a base station. Although, their scheme 
provides adequate security to patients, it does not care about the strong professional authentication (i.e., 
who is accessing the patients’ vital signs), whereas user authentication is a prime concern under 
various laws [29]. 
Hu et al. [32] have designed and proposed a software and hardware based real-time cardiac patient 
healthcare monitoring system named ‘tele-cardiology sensor network’ (TSN). TSN is particularly 
intended for the U.S. healthcare society. It enables real-time healthcare data collection for elderly 
patients in a large nursing home. In this architecture, a patient’s ECG signals are automatically 
collected and processed by an ECG sensor and transmitted in a timely way through a wireless channel 
to an ECG server for further analysis. TSN integrates with large number of wireless ECG communication 
units; each unit being called a mobile platform. A block cipher algorithm (i.e., skipjack) is used for 
securing ECG data transmission, and protecting patient privacy. Although their proposal provides 
privacy in term of confidentiality and achieves integrity, strong user authentication is not addressed 
effectively. 
Huang et al. [18] proposed a secure hierarchical sensor-based healthcare monitoring architecture. 
The proposed architecture has three network tiers (i.e., sensor network, mobile network, and back-end 
network), and has considered three real-time healthcare applications (i.e., in-hospital, in-home, and 
nursing-house) scenarios. The authors used wearable sensor systems (WSS) and wireless sensor motes 
(WSM) at the sensor network tier. The WSS are Bluetooth enabled and integrated with biomedical 
sensors; and the WSS are strategically placed on the patient’s body, whereas, the WSMs are deployed 
within the building, and are used to collect the environmental parameters and transmit through the  
Zig-bee wireless network standard. WSS and WSM broadcast data securely to the upper layer. Here, 
WSS uses an advance encryption standard (AES)-based authentication and encryption, while WSM 
uses a polynomial-based encryption scheme to establish secure point-to-point communication between Sensors 2012, 12  
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two WSMs. In the mobile network tier, mobile computing devices (MCDs) such as PDAs are 
organized as an ad-hoc network and connected to the local station. MCD has the more computational 
capabilities to analyze the WSS and WSM data. The back-end tier is structured with a fixed station as 
a server, that provides application level services for lower tiers and process various sensed data from 
MCDs. Even though Huang et al. proposed a secure pervasive hierarchical sensor-based healthcare 
monitoring, they did not consider the need for strong user authentication, which is an imperative 
security for healthcare applications according to laws (i.e., HIPAA [29]). 
Very recently, Le et al. [34] suggested a mutual authentication and access control protocol 
(MAACE) where legitimate professionals can access their patient’s data. The MAACE facilitates 
mutual authentication and access control, which is based on elliptic curve cryptography (ECC). 
Furthermore, these authors argue that their scheme is secure enough in practical attacks, e.g., replay 
attack, and denial-of-service attacks. Their architecture (i.e., MAACE) consists of three layers: (i) 
sensor network layer (SN); (ii) coordination network layer (CN); and (iii) data access layer (DA). In 
their architecture, the SN transmits data to the CN (i.e., PDA, laptop or cell phone), later, the data is 
forwarded to the DA for future record. Although, Le et al.’s protocol facilitates sufficient security 
against practical attacks, but their scheme susceptible to information-leakage attacks, which could be 
risky for the patient’s privacy. As a result, patient vital signs are could exposed to illegal users (e.g., 
insurance agents, media persons, etc.), which is not acceptable for real-time healthcare applications. 
Thus, a strong user authentication is required for the healthcare application using sensor networks.  
In 2009, Das [42] has proposed two-factor user authentication protocol for wireless sensor networks. 
Das claimed that his protocol is safe against many attacks (i.e., replay attack, password-guessing 
attack, user impersonation attack, node compromise attack, and stolen-verifier attack). Later,   
others [44,46] have pointed out that Das protocol is susceptible to the gateway bypass attack, user 
impersonation attack, insider attack, etc. Furthermore, Das’ protocol does not provide message 
confidentiality, and mutual authentication between the sensor and the user. Consequently, this protocol 
is not applicable to healthcare applications using sensor networks. 
In [49], Kumar-Lee has shown that some authentication protocols [44,46] have security weaknesses 
and the computation costs of their protocols are very expensive. Thus, the protocols in [44] and [46] 
are not suitable for such wireless healthcare applications.  
As we can notice from the above literatures, strong user authentication for healthcare application 
using wireless medical sensor networks has not yet been addressed adequately. Hence, a significant 
research effort is still required to explore the user authentication for WSN healthcare application. So, 
next section proposes an efficient-strong authentication protocol, named E-SAP, for healthcare 
applications using WMSNs. 
4. The Proposed E-SAP Protocol  
This section presents the proposed efficient-strong authentication protocol (E-SAP) where only 
legitimate professionals can access the patient’s body data in an authentic manner. The proposed 
protocol can be applicable to hospitals, homes and clinical environments. The basic idea of E-SAP is 
quite simple: professionals need to register with the gateway node at hospital registration center. Upon 
successful registration, the professional receives a smart card from the registration center. Then, Sensors 2012, 12  
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professionals can access the patient physiological information’s from the patient body area sensor 
network, whenever demanded. In order to prove the professional legitimacy, a professional sends 
his/her password and smart card based login request to the gateway node. Upon receiving the 
professional requests the gateway node first authenticates him/her, and then forwards the professional’s 
request to the dedicated medical sensor, whose data the user is demanding. Thereafter, the medical 
sensor checks the authenticity of the gateway node and establishes a secure session key between the 
medical sensor and the professional and responds to the professional. In order to execute the proposed 
protocol, we have considered the following assumptions: 
1.  We assumed that the hospital registration center is a trusted authority. 
2.  The gateway node has three long master keys (i.e., J, K and Q (256 bits long each)). 
3.  Initially, it is assumed that the gateway and the medical sensor nodes share a long-term secret 
key SKgs = h(Q||IDg) using any key agreement method [50,51]. 
Table 1 gives a list of notations with descriptions which are used throughout in the paper.  
The proposed E-SAP consists of four phases, namely, the professional registration phase, patient 
registration phase, login and authentication phase, and password change phase. 
Table 1. Notation and Description. 
Notations Description 
Ui  User i
th want to login 
IDi ID of user Ui 
PWi  Password of user Ui 
IDpt Patient  ID 
GW  Gateway node 
IDg  Gateway ID 
Sn  Sensor node 
J, K and Q  Gateway secrets 
EKey[]  Symmetric encryption using shared key. 
DKey[]  Symmetric decryption using shared key. 
M  User’s generated nonce 
h(.)  One-way cryptographic hash function 
  XOR operation 
||  Concatenation operation 
4.1. Professional Registration Phase 
In this phase, the professional initially needs to register with the gateway node at the registration 
center, as follows: 
  User chooses IDi and PWi and submits to GW node using secure channel. 
  Upon receiving user’s IDi and PWi, the GW node computes the following: 
a.  Cig= EJ[IDi||IDg] 
b.  Ni= h(IDiPWiK) 
Thereafter, the GW node issues a smart card to the professional with the following {h(.), Cig, Ni, K}. 
Here, K is a long-term GW node secret, which is securely stored in the smart card. Sensors 2012, 12  
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4.2. Patient Registration Phase  
In order to execute the proposed E-SAP, a patient needs to register at the hospital registration  
center [38], as follows: 
  Patient passes his/her name to the registration center. 
  After patient registration, registration center choose the suitable sensor kit (i.e., medical sensor 
and gateway) and designate professionals/users.  
  Later, registration center sends patient IDpt and medical sensors kit information (i.e., gateway, 
sensor etc.) to the designated professionals/users. 
Now, the technician deploys wireless medical sensors on the patient body area, strategically, as 
shown in Figure 2.  
4.3. Login and Authentication Phase  
This phase is invoked when a professional roams into the patients’ ward and wants to perform a 
query or to access the patients’ physiological information from the body network. This phase is further 
divided into login phase and authentication phase. 
4.3.1. Login Phase  
The professional inserts his/her smart card into the terminal and inputs keys, IDi and PWi. Upon 
receiving the login request, the smart card verifies the user locally with pre-stored values and performs 
operations, as follows: 
  Ni* =  h(IDiPWiK)and compare N i* =  N i,  if yes, then go to the next step, otherwise, 
terminates the request.  
  Compute:  h(IDi) and CIDi =  E K[h(IDi)||M||Sn||Cig||T′]. Here, M is a random nonce that is 
generated by professional system, which is used to establish the secure session key. 
Then professional’s system sends message <CIDi, T′> to GW node. Here, T′ is the current time 
stamp of professional system.  
4.3.2. Authentication Phase 
This phase is invoked when the GW node receives a login request from a professional. Upon 
receiving the login request at time T′′, the GW node performs the following and authenticates him/her, as: 
  Validate the time T: check, if (T′′ − T′) ≥ ∆T, if yes, then rejects the request and aborts any 
further process. Otherwise, it performs the next steps. Here, T′′ is the current time of GW node 
and ∆T is the time interval for the transmission delay. 
  Decrypt sub-message CIDi using key K (i.e., DK [CIDi]) and obtain h(IDi)
§, Sn, M and T′
§. 
Similarly, decrypt sub-message Cig using the shared key J (i.e., DJ [Cig]) and obtain IDi* and 
IDg*. 
  Compute h(IDi)*, and compare h(IDi)* = h(IDi)
§, IDg* = IDg and T′ = T′
§ , if yes, then the 
request is authentic; otherwise, terminate any further processes. Sensors 2012, 12  
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  Compute:  Ai =   ESKgs [IDi||Sn||M||T′′′||T′], here T′′′  is the current time stamp of GW node. 
Thereafter, the GW node sends a message <Ai, T′′′> to the medical sensor that the professional 
wants to access. Furthermore, Ai ensures to the medical sensor that the request has come from 
the legal gateway node. 
Upon receiving the gateway node message, the medical sensor node performs the following steps: 
  Validate the time T: check, if (T′′′′ − T′′′) ≥ ∆T, if yes, then it rejects the request and aborts any 
further process. Otherwise, it performs the next steps. Here, T′′′′ is the current time of the 
medical sensor node and ∆T is the time interval for the transmission delay. 
  The medical sensor (Sn) decrypts the sub-message Ai using shared key SKgs (i.e., DSKgs [Ai]), 
and obtains IDi*, Sn*, M*, T′′′* and T′. 
  Now, Sn compares Sn* = Sn and T′′′ = T′′′*, if not, then it aborts the request; otherwise it 
continues with the next steps. 
  Compute session key SK = h (IDi*||Sn||M*||T′), and message L = ESK [Sn||M*||T*], here, T* is 
the current time stamp of the medical sensor node. After that, the medical sensor node sends a 
response message <L, T*> to the professional. 
Upon receiving the medical sensor node response, the professional validates the time as follows: 
  Validate the time T*: check, if (T** − T*) ≥ ∆T, if yes, then it rejects the request and terminates. 
Otherwise, it continues with the further process. Here, T** is the current time of the 
professional system and ∆T is the time interval for the transmission delay. 
  The professional system computes SK = h (IDi||Sn||M||T′). 
  Decrypt the message L using SK, and obtain Sn* and M*. Thereafter, compare Sn*= Sn, and 
M* = M, if yes, then a secure session key has been established; otherwise not. 
The flow of the login and authentication phases is shown in Figure 3.  
4.4. Password-Change Phase 
The password-change phase is invoked when Ui wants to change/update the password, when he/she 
requires. The password change procedure is as follows: 
  The user inserts his/her smart card into the terminal and enter keys (i.e., IDi and PWi). 
  Smart card performs the operations: 
a.  Ni* = h(IDiPWiK) 
b.  Compare Ni* = Ni, if yes, then perform the next step; otherwise abort the operation. 
  Enter new password PWinew. 
  Compute Ninew = h (IDiPWinewK). 
  Replace Ni with Ninew from the smart card.  Sensors 2012, 12  
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Figure 3. Flow of the Login and Authentication phases. 
 
 
  Ni*= h(IDiPWiK), and 
 verify Ni*=Ni, if not, then reject. 
  Compute h(IDi)and CIDi=EK[h(IDi)||M||Sn||Cig||T′]                                            
                                           <CIDi,T′> 
 
  (T′′-T′) ≥ ∆T, if yes, then abort 
  DK[CIDi ] and obtained h(IDi)
 §, Sn, M and T′
§ 
  DJ[Cig] and obtained IDi* and IDg* 
  Compute  h(IDi)*, and Verify: h(IDi)*=h(IDi)
§, 
IDg*=IDg and T′=T′
§ if not, then abort 
  Ai=ESKgs[IDi||Sn||M||T′′′||T′]                                       
                                  <Ai, T′′′> 
 
  (T′′′′-T′′′)  ≥  ∆T, if yes, then 
abort 
  DSKgs[Ai], and obtained IDi*, 
Sn*, M*, T′′′* and T′ 
  Compares  Sn*=Sn, and T′′′= 
T′′′* if not, then abort 
  Compute 
SK=h(IDi*||Sn||M*||T′) 
  Compute L = ESK[Sn||M*||T*] 
                                                                                 <L,T*> 
 
  (T**-T*) ≥ ∆T, if yes, then aborts the request 
  Computes SK=h(ID||Sn||M||T′) 
  DSK[L], and obtain Sn* and M* 
  Compares Sn*= Sn, and M*= M, if yes, then secure session key has been established. 
5. Formal Analysis of E-SAP Using BAN Logic 
Formal analysis ensures that the protocol functions are correctly modeled, and needs to be verified, 
(i.e., error free) before their real-time implementation [48]. In this regards, this section describes the 
formal verification of E-SAP using BAN logic, which is popular for formal verification of 
authentication protocols. The section is divided into: (A) brief overview of the BAN logic, which was 
introduced by Burrows, Abadi and Needham [48]; and (B) a demonstration of the formal execution 
and validity proofs of the proposed E-SAP using the BAN authentication logic model.  
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5.1. BAN Logic 
The BAN logic is a popular authentication protocols analysis model, and it is useful to prove the 
validity of authentication and key establishment protocols, for more details the readers may refer  
to [48]. The notations used in BAN logic are defined as follows: 
  P believes X: The main construct of logic is ‘P believes X’ (i.e., the principal P believes on X) 
or P would be entitled to believe X.  
  P sees X: Only ‘P sees X’,  i.e., suppose someone has sent a confidential message (i.e., 
encrypted message) containing X to P, then P can read X  (i.e., after performing some 
decryption).  
  P said X: The principal ‘P once said X’; means, at some time the principal P sent a message 
including X. 
  P controls X: The principal ‘P has controls over X’; means, the principal P is an authority on X 
and should be trusted (e.g., a server is often assumed trusted and generate secret keys properly). 
  Fresh(X):  Fresh(X) means, X has not been sent recent in a message during the protocol 
execution. Furthermore, Fresh(X) protects from replay attack. 
  Q
K
P  : The principal P and Q may use secret shared key K for secure communication. The 
keys K will never be disclosed to others except for the designated principals (i.e., P and Q).  
  {X}K: Means the formula X is encrypted using the key K. 
  <X>Y: The formula X is combined with secret parameter Y. 
Now, we have defines some logical rules that we use in proofs, and which are directly adopted  
from [49], as follows: 
  Message-meaning rule 
X said Q believes P
K X sees P P
K
Q believes P } { , 
 
  Nonce-verification rule  
believesX Q believes P
X said Q believes P X fresh believes P ), (
 
  Controls rule 
X believes P
X believes Q believes P X, controls Q believes P
 
  Fresh rule  
) , (
) (
Y X fresh believes P
X fresh believes P
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5.2. Formal Verification of the Proposed E-SAP 
This sub-section demonstrates the formal verification of our proposed protocol using the BAN logic 
analysis model [48]. The main principals of E-SAP are: user (Ui), gateway (GW) and medical sensor 
node  (Sn). The following symbols are used: (a) the secret keys are J,  K,  SKgs and SK; (b) the   
time-stamps are T′, T′′′ and T*. The main goal of formal verification is to establish a secure session key 
between the user and the medical sensor node. To perform the formal verification of E-SAP, we use 
the following logical postulates: 
  Ui believes Ui 
SK
 Sn, 
  Ui believes Sn believes Ui 
SK
 Sn 
  Sn believes Ui 
SK
 Sn, 
  Sn believes Ui believes Ui 
SK
 Sn 
The protocol messages (as shown in Figure 3) are needs to be transform into the idealized form, as 
shown in Table 2: 
Table 2. E-SAP messages transform into the idealized form. 
E-SAP messages:  
Message1:Ui→GW:<CIDi,,T′>(i.e., EK[h(IDi)||M||Sn||Cig||T′], T′) 
Message2: GW→ Sn: <Ai,T′′′>(i.e., ESKgs[IDi||Sn||M||T′′′||T′], T′′′) 
Message 3: Sn→Ui: <L, T*> (i.e., ESK[Sn||M*||T*], T*). 
Idealized form: 
Message 1: Ui→GW:{h(IDi)||M||Sn||{ IDi||IDg}J||T′}K, T′ 
Message 2: GW→ Sn: {IDi||Sn||M||T′′′||T′}SKgs, T′′′ 
Message 3: Sn→Ui: {Sn||M*||T*}SK , T* 
 
Session key SK = h(IDi*||Sn||M*||T′) 
E-SAP formal analysis using BAN logic required further assumptions, as follows: 
A1) Ui believes GW 
K
 Ui 
A2) GW believes Ui 
K
 GW 
A3) GW believes Ui 
J
 GW 
A4) GW believes Sn 
SKgs
  GW 
A5) Sn believes GW 
SKgs
  Sn 
A6) Sn believes Ui 
SK
 Sn 
A7) Ui believes Sn 
SK
 Ui 
A8) Sn believes (Ui controls Ui 
SK
 Sn) 
A9) GW believes GW
J
 GW 
A10) GW believes (Ui controls IDi) 
A11) Ui believes fresh (M) Sensors 2012, 12  
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A12) Ui believes Sn fresh (T*) 
A13) GW believes Ui fresh (T′) 
A14) Sn believes GW fresh (T′′′) 
A15) Sn believes GW fresh (M) 
A16) Sn believes (GW controls IDi) 
Based on the above assumptions and BAN logic rules, we perform the verification of the proposed 
E-SAP, as shown in Table 3.  
Table 3. Formal verification of E-SAP using BAN logic model. 
Message 1: Ui→GW:{ h(IDi)||M||Sn||{ IDi||IDg}J||T′ }K , T′ 
S1) GW sees { h(IDi)||M||Sn||{IDi||IDg}J||T′ }K ,T′ // by seeing rule 
S2) GW believes Ui 
K
 GW // by A1, A2, S1, message-meaning rule 
S3) GW believes Ui controls IDi // by A10, controls rule 
S4) GW believes Ui fresh (M) // by message-meaning and fresh rule  
S5) GW believes GW
J
 GW // by A9, S1, message-meaning rule 
S6) GW believes Ui fresh ( T′) // by S4, A13, fresh rule 
S7) GW believes Sn said {IDi||Sn||M||T′′′||T′}SKgs , T′′′ // by message-meaning rule 
Message 2: GW→ Sn: { IDi||Sn||M||T′′′||T′}SKgs , T′′′ 
S8) Sn sees {IDi||Sn||M||T′′′||T′}SKgs , T′′′ // by seeing rule 
S9) Sn believes GW fresh(T′′′ ) // by A14, fresh rule 
S10) Sn believes GW 
SKgs
  Sn // by A5, S8, message-meaning rule 
S11) Sn believes (GW controls IDi) // by S8, A16, controls rule 
S12) Sn believes GW fresh(M) // by A15, fresh rule 
S13) Sn believes Ui 
SK
 Sn // by A6, S8, message-meaning rule 
S14 Sn believes Ui said { Sn||M*||T*}SK , T* 
Message 3: Sn→Ui: { Sn||M*||T*}SK , T* 
S15) Ui sees { Sn||M*||T*}SK , T* // by seeing rule 
S16) Ui believes Sn fresh (T*) // by A12, fresh rule 
S17) Ui believes Sn
SK
 Ui // by A7, S15, message-meaning rule 
S18)Ui believes Sn fresh(M) // by fresh rule  
S19) Ui believes Sn believes Ui 
SK
 Sn // by S 15, message-meaning rule 
S20) Ui believes Ui 
SK
 Sn 
As we can see from the above verification, A7, S13, S19 and S20 establish the secure session key 
between the user and the medical sensor. Furthermore, A3, A10, S5, S11, S19 and S20 verify mutual 
authentication between the user and medical sensor using the gateway. Hence, the goal of E-SAP is Sensors 2012, 12  
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achieved (i.e., secure session key has established and only authentic users can access an individual’s 
body information from the wireless medical sensor networks). 
6. E-SAP Evaluation 
This section discusses the security analysis and functionality analysis of the proposed E-SAP   
for healthcare application using medical sensor networks. Further, we present a performance analysis 
of E-SAP. The following assumptions are considered before evaluating the proposed protocol, which 
is based on a smart card and password (i.e., two-factor): 
  The adversary has total control of wireless communication; he/she may intercept, delete or alter 
any message in the communication (recall the discussion of attack model in Section 2). 
  The attacker either obtains a user’s password, or extracts the secrets from the smart card 
through [52,53], but not both (i.e., password and smart card) at the same time [50].  
  Assumed that, extracting secrets from smart card is quite complex and some smart card 
manufacturer provide countermeasures against side channel attacks [42,50]. In [54] authors 
proposed some software countermeasures against power analysis attack.  
  We assumed that the symmetric cryptosystems are secure enough to protect patient 
physiological information from cracking, and any encrypted text cannot be decrypted without 
having the secret keys, which is known only to the trusted entities (i.e., user, gateway, medical 
sensor and hospital registration center). 
6.1. Security Analysis 
This sub-section shows the proposed protocol is secure against many practical attacks. In additions, 
the proposed E-SAP facilitates: confidentiality, mutual authentication between the user and the 
medical sensor, a secure session key establishment between the medical sensor node and the 
professionals, and professionals can change their password, securely. 
Replay attack: The proposed protocol is resistant to replay attacks. Assume that an adversary re-
play the old captured messages to the gateway (i.e., <CIDi,T′>), the medical sensor (i.e., <Ai, T′′′>) , 
and the user (i.e., <L,T*>). However, he/she (attacker) cannot pass the old messages, because all 
messages are validated by the fresh time stamps, which are contained in the protocol messages (i.e., 
(T′′-T′) ≥ ∆T, (T′′′′-T′′′) ≥ ∆T and (T**-T*) ≥ ∆T.  
Masquerading user attack: An attacker cannot masquerade as the professional (Ui). Suppose an 
adversary were able to forge a login message <CIDi, T′>. Now the adversary will try to login into the 
WMSN with a modified message <CIDi*, T′>. He/she cannot pass the fake message because the 
forged CIDi* will not be verified at the gateway node and the gateway node cannot get the original 
message (i.e., (h(IDi)||Sn||M||Cig||T′)) by decrypting the fake CIDi*. 
Masquerading gateway attack: An attacker cannot impersonate a gateway, since he/she does not 
have any idea how to get J, K and SKgs from the protocol messages. So, masquerading as the gateway 
is not applicable to the E-SAP. Sensors 2012, 12  
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Gateway secret guessing attack:  The proposed scheme is secure against the gateway secret 
guessing attack. The gateway has three master keys (i.e., J, K and Q), which are not transmitted as 
plaintext. Hence, E-SAP is secure against gateway secret guessing. 
Stolen verifier attack: In [43], a user table (i.e., IDi and PWi) is stored on the gateway node, which 
may be a high risk to breach the security of protocols. In contrast, the E-SAP protocol does not use any 
IDi table and password table. So any stolen-verifier attack will not applicable on the proposed protocol. 
Password guessing attack: An attacker cannot guess the password in our scheme. In the proposed 
protocol password is not passing as plaintext, instead Ni= h (IDiPWiK), so password guessing is 
not possible. 
Mutual authentication: The proposed E-SAP provides mutual authentication between the user and 
the medical sensor. As shown in the Figure 3, the gateway sends message <Ai, T′′′> to the medical 
sensor. Here, Ai = ESKgs [IDi||Sn||M||T′′′||T′] and it ensures to the medical sensor that the message has 
come from the legitimate gateway node. Thus, the medical sensor believes that the user is a legitimate 
user. Furthermore, when the user receives a medical sensor message <L, T*>, then he/she verifies the 
medical sensor (i.e., whether real or not). Hence, the proposed protocol achieves mutual authentication 
between the user and the medical sensor.  
Information-leakage attack: The protocol information-leakage gives room to the attackers, which 
could be harmful for the patient privacy. In E-SAP, suppose an adversary eavesdrops the protocol 
messages (i.e., <CIDi, T′> <Ai, T′′′> and <L, T*>). Here, the sub-message CIDi is encrypted using 
shared secret K, the message Ai is encrypted using shared SKgs, and the sub-message L is encrypted 
using SK. Therefore, E-SAP messages information’s are not leaked during communication. As a result, 
information-leakage attacks not applicable to our protocol.  
Secure session key: The proposed E-SAP establishes a secure session key between the user and the 
medical sensor node after the authentication phase taken place. As we can see in Figure 3, a session 
key (SK=h (IDi*||Sn||M*||T′)) is setup between the medical sensor node and the user. Furthermore, the 
established session key provides confidentiality for subsequent communication; and for each session 
the session key will fresh.  
Confidentiality:  Confidentiality is a paramount requirement for healthcare application using 
wireless medical sensor networks. In the proposed E-SAP, the session key could be used for further 
secure subsequent communication between both (i.e., user and medical sensor node may encrypt 
patient physiological information’s using the session key (SK)). Furthermore, the proposed protocol 
provides air message confidentiality to their messages (CIDi=EK [h(IDi)||M||Sn|| Cig||T′], Ai=ESKgs 
[IDi||Sn || M ||T′′′||T′]and L = ESK[Sn||M*||T*]).  
Secure password change: In the password-change phase, the proposed protocol first verifies the 
user’s old password and identity, and only then requests a new password. Otherwise it rejects the 
password change request. Thus, the proposed scheme is secure against changed passwords. 
6.2. E-SAP Functionality Analysis  
This subsection shows the E-SAP functionality and makes a comparison with related schemes (i.e., 
Le et al. [34], Das [42], Vaidya et al. [43] and He et al. [46]). As shown in Table 4, the proposed 
protocol provides more functionality such as strong user authentication, mutual authentication between Sensors 2012, 12  
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the user and the medical sensor node, it establishes a secure session key for the user and the medical 
sensor node, message confidentiality and professionals are able to change their password, whereas  
in [34,42,43] and [46] the schemes provides less security functionality, which are paramount 
requirements (recall section 2-C) for wireless healthcare applications. Further, it can be seen from 
Table 4 that the proposed E-SAP is robust against many popular types of attacks (e.g., replay attack, 
masquerade attack, gateway secret guessing attack, and information-leakage attack) as compared to 
other schemes. It is worth notice that our protocol provides indispensable security features, whereas, the 
schemes in [34,42,43,46] provide less security functionality for real-time healthcare applications. 
Table 4. Comparison of E-SAP functionality with related schemes. 
Functionalities  [34] [42] [43] [46] Proposed  E-SAP 
Strong user authentication  No  Yes  No  Yes  Yes 
Mutual authentication between Ui and Sn  Yes No Yes No  Yes 
Session  key  establishment  No No No No  Yes 
Secure password change  NA  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Message  confidentiality  No No No No  Yes 
Protection to replay message  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Secure against GW secret key guessing attack  Yes  No  No  No  Yes 
Secure against user masquerading attack  Yes  No  No  No  Yes 
Secure against gateway masquerading attack  No  No  No  No  Yes 
Secure against Information-leakage attack  No  No  No  No  Yes 
Protocol  formal  verification  No No No No  Yes 
NA: Not applicable. 
6.3. E-SAP Performance Evaluation 
This subsection evaluates the performance of proposed protocol in term of computation cost, 
communication cost and compares the results with [34,42,43,46].  
The performance evaluation parameters are: 
Tpu: public-key computation, Tpr: private-key computation,  
H (performing one hash function), S (symmetric-cryptosystem), and M (performing one message 
authentication code). 
Computation cost: The medical sensor devices (i.e., gateway node and sensor node) have limited 
power resources and computation capability. Therefore, the computation cost is a prime factor for 
resource constrained devices. The user registration computation cost is a one-time task and it is not a 
main concern, whereas the login and authentication computation cost are a prime concern due to the 
resource constrained nature of the gateway node and the medical sensors nodes. Table 5 shows the 
computation cost of the proposed E-SAP and related schemes, i.e., Das [42], Vaidya et al. [43], and  
He et al. [46]. It is easy to see from Table 5, in registration phase the proposed E-SAP needs only 1H 
and 1S at GW node, whereas [42,43,46] require, 3H, 4H and 5H, respectively, which a is high 
computation cost at GW node.  
Further, the Le et al. [34] scheme requires modular exponentiation to compute the public and 
private keys, so their scheme is computationally expensive and time-consuming, and it also needs to Sensors 2012, 12  
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generate and verify digital certificates. In the login and authentication phase, E-SAP requires 6H and 
7S, and provides more security. In contrast [34,42,43,46] require 4H+4S+6M, 7H, 9H and 7H, 
respectively, and provide less security services. This is due to the fact that the proposed E-SAP 
incurred more computation cost and provides paramount security functionality to healthcare 
applications as compared to [42,43,46]. Thus, the computation cost of E-SAP is well-suited to the 
healthcare applications using wireless medical sensor networks. 
Table 5. Performance comparison of E-SAP with existing schemes. 
Schemes 
Registration  Login and authentication 
User GW  User  GW  Sn 
Le et al.’s [32]  Tpu+Tpr T pr 1H+1S+2M  2H+2S+2M  1H+1S+2M 
Das’s [40]  − 3H  4H  4H  1H 
Vaidya et al.’s[41] 2H  2H  3H  3H  3H 
He et al.’s [44]  1H  5H  5H  5H  1H 
Proposed E-SAP  − 1H+1S  4H+2S  1H+3S  1H+2S 
Communication cost: The communication cost is an important issue in wireless communication, 
(i.e., more message exchanges consume more power). From Figure 3, it is easy to visualize that the 
proposed E-SAP requires three message exchanges between the user, the gateway and the medical 
sensor, whereas the schemes in [42] and [46] require three message exchanges, and [34] and [43] 
require four exchanges. Hence, the proposed protocol is well-suited and quite simple in enhancing the 
wireless communication security for healthcare application.  
Considering the functionality, computation cost, and communication cost of E-SAP, it is clear that 
our protocol is more efficient for healthcare applications using medical sensor networks as compared  
to others [34,42,43,46].  
7. Conclusions  
Wireless medical sensors offer services to professionals; but what do we do to verify the 
professionals (i.e., authentic or not). That poses a question to researchers, how to protect medical 
sensor data from illegal users? 
In order to solve the above questions, this paper proposed E-SAP, an efficient-strong user 
authentication protocol for healthcare application using wireless medical sensor networks. E-SAP 
utilizes two-factor security features and provides strong user authentication, confidentiality and session 
key establishment for healthcare application using WMSNs. It is noteworthy that E-SAP is more 
capable in terms of security services, computation and communication cost, as compared to other 
existing protocols. Furthermore, through intensive analysis (i.e., BAN logic authentication model) we 
have shown that E-SAP achieves its stated security goals and is defensive against many popular types 
of attacks. It is a well-suited protocol for hospital, homecare, and clinic healthcare applications using 
wireless medical sensors.  
The future directions for this study are: (1) to develop a real-time heterogeneous biomedical sensor 
network for healthcare monitoring, (2) implement E-SAP on a real-time test-bed for healthcare 
application, and (3) more focus on access control in patient mobility scenarios and strong patient privacy. Sensors 2012, 12  
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